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MASTERS IN ECONOMICS 
 
 
§ ~50% upside potential with an indicative FY18 intrinsic 
value per share of € 117.4 based on the realisation of margin 
expansion in LatAm, rationalisation of US brewing footprint, strong 
volume growth in EM and a smooth deleveraging process.  
§ ~17% underperformance since 4Q16 SABMiller closing 
has evaporated 10yr average P/E premium of ~30% to a discount 
of ~1%; significant rerate potential as benefits are reaped from 
transformational period. 
§ We argue that AB InBev’s brand value (7 of top 10 global 
beer brands), economies of scales (~28% global market share) + 
high barriers to entry justify returns on invested capital exceeding 
its cost of capital by ~1.5% in perpetuity; next 10yrs by ~3% 
reverting back to pre-SABMiller levels.  
§ We project sales to grow organically at ~3% p.a. over the 
next five years with ~5.1% EBITDA growth p.a.; margin expansion 
by capture of additional $ ~1.3 billion in SABMiller synergies and 
further brewing footprint rationalisation (mainly in LatAm and US). 
§ 4Q17 outperformance with 8.1% revenue growth, 6.6% 
revenue per hl growth, 1.6% volume growth (2.3% beer volume 
growth), 21.0% EBITDA growth, 446 bps EBITDA margin 
expansion and 141.9% normalised EPS growth (6.12% surprise). 
Company description 
Anheuser-Bush InBev (“AB InBev”) is the world’s largest brewing 
company. AB InBev sells over 500 beer brands across more than 
100 countries. The USA, Brazil and Mexico are its most important 
markets, with the recent acquisition of SABMiller adding significant 
exposure to African markets.  
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Source: Bloomberg 
($ millions; excl. ratios, EPS) 2017A 2018E 2019E 
Revenue 56,444 57,802 59,339 
Gross profit 35,058 36,211 37,467 
EBITDA 21,474 23,806 24,889 
EBIT 17,813 19,790 20,794 
Net profit 9,183 11,974 12,743 
EPS  4.75 6.15 6.50 
Net debt-to-EBITDA 4.6x 3.9x 3.4x 
ROIC 7.7% 8.2% 8.5% 
P/E 20.6 15.9 15.1 
EV-to-EBITDA 14.7 13.3 12.8 
Source: Bloomberg, own estimates 
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We initiate a BUY with a 12-month price target of € 117.4. Including our 
expected dividend yield, this would work out to a total shareholders’ return of 
48.7% over the next 12-months. The expected total shareholder’s return is based 
on the realisation of margin improvements in Latin America fuelled by a strong 
economic recovery in Brazil, further rationalisation of the North American brewing 
footprint, accelerating organic growth in APAC and Africa and a smooth 
deleveraging process following the transformational SABMiller acquisition.  
AB InBev’s stock price has declined by 23.6% (net dividends reinvested) since 
completing the SABMiller acquisition in October 2016, underperforming the MSCI 
Europe Consumer Staples Index – which has declined by 6.3% (net dividends 
reinvested) over the same period – by 17.3%. We believe AB InBev’s 
transformational period is coming to an end, presenting an excellent buying 
opportunity. For the first time in nine years, AB InBev’s stock trades at a P/E 
discount to its peers. Now that the first signs of improvement were visible in 
the 4Q17 results (i.e. the Brazil situation improving, favourable FX 
developments, higher than expected SABMiller synergies and consensus EPS 
outperformance), we believe such discount to be unjustified. In our opinion, a 
stock price of € ~105 – eliminating the relative valuation discount – is feasible in 
the next six months if HYQ18 results show proof of increased profit margins in 
North America to accommodate for local volume loss. Furthermore, we believe a 
gradual rerate towards its average 10-year P/E premium of ~30% is due over 
the next 3-5 years as AB InBev captures the benefits of its transformational 
period.  
The skin in the game of the controlling shareholders – i.e. the Belgian families 
and the Brazilian founders of 3G Capital ($ ~100 billion) and the executive 
management ($ ~2 billion) in combination with an effective incentive structure 
across all levels of employment has resulted in an owner-operators culture at 
AB InBev. With the influence of 3G Capital – of which the founding partners have 
been significant shareholders for over 30 years, AB InBev has become a lean 
and mean organisation with superior profitability (~38% 2017A EBITDA margin 
vs ~22% for listed breweries). A centralised operational structure combined 
with a plug-and-play global distribution network has allowed AB InBev to build an 
unparalleled track-record of acquisitive growth – resulting in a global market 














Incorporated through the merger of InBev with Anheuser-Bush in 2008, AB InBev 
is the largest global brewer (~28% global market share in terms of volume). AB 
InBev employs ~200 thousand individuals in more than 50 countries worldwide, 
collectively responsible for over 500 beer brands (2017 BrandZ top 100 ranks 
seven of AB InBev’s brands within the top 10 global beer brands; 19 brands 
generate annual sales exceeding $ 1 billion) sold across more than 100 
countries. The company is geographically diversified, with balanced exposure to 
developed and developing markets. Please refer to Appendix A for a historic 
overview of AB InBev with a detailed overview of transformational M&A activity.  
AB InBev’s business model is built around cost efficiency (strict application of 
zero-based budgeting; 38.0% 2017A EBITDA compared to a peer group average 
of 24.3%; please refer to Appendix B for an overview of the selected group of 
comparable companies), acquisitive growth (merged with the 5th largest global 
brewer in 2004, acquired the 2nd largest global brewer in 2008 and again in 2016; 
~10 smaller acquisition p.a.) and a globalised network (derives organic growth 
from cross-selling and margin expansion through its procurement network).  
AB InBev’s culture is orchestrated around shareholders’ alignment (executive 
management owns $ ~2 billion of stock; controlling families have $ ~100 billion 
tied up in AB InBev – more than the Carlsberg Foundation, the Heineken Family 
and Societe Paul Pernod Richard combined – and are still closely involved), 
incentive alignment (exceptional target-related compensation; e.g. 2020 Dream 
Incentive Plan to pay out $ 350 million to 65 top managers if revenue exceeds $ 
100 billion by 2020-2022) and meritocracy (radical transparency towards 






















Following the transformative period of the SABMiller acquisition, 2018 could 
mark a turning point for investor’s sentiment and stock performance. Over the 
past 3-5 years, investors have mainly been concerned with Brazil’s political and 
economic crisis (real GDP contractions of 3.8% and 3.6% in 2015 and 2016 
respectively), weak volume growth in the North American segment (five years of 
negative volume growth) and the pace of deleveraging (4.6x net debt-to-EBITDA 
compared to a target net debt-to-EBITDA of 2.0x) after a period of aggressive 
consolidation.  
We believe 2017 marked the start of an anticipated return to sustainable 
volume growth (accelerating organic volume growth throughout the year; 
reached 8.2% in 4Q17 – the highest in three years), a strong economic 
recovery in Brazil (real GDP growth of 1.0% in 2017; real GDP growth of 1.9-
2.6% p.a. expected in 2018-2019; strong uptick in 17Q4 with 23.7% EBITDA 
growth) will pave the way for material margin expansion in Latin America and the 
benign competitive environment and high barriers to entry in emerging 
markets will further increase AB InBev’s EM profit pool. A temporary 
dividend cut in terms of recurring operating profit (~25% according to our 
estimates) within the next two to three years may be required to relief investor’s 
doubt regarding AB InBev’s leveraged balance sheet but we believe this will not 
have a significant impact on the stock price. Management has reiterated on 
multiple occasions that it is their goal for the dividend to be a growing flow over 
time. However, we believe the pay-out ratio to be too high to accommodate a 
smooth and gradual deleveraging process.  
In our opinion, the main risks are credit and FX related. AB InBev has the 
majority of its debt denominated in US dollars (~64%) and in euros (~28%) while 
the majority of cash earnings are denominated in EM currencies (59-74%; 
approximation based on geographical EBIT split). Weakness in EM currencies 
could have a material adverse impact on AB InBev’s ability to generate the cash 
flows required to deleverage and create headroom for investments. In any event, 
it seems unlikely that a next megadeal will occur in time to achieve the 
ambitious 2020 Dream Incentive Plan (i.e. $ 350 million incentive programme 
to boost revenue towards $ 100 billion). On the contrary, we believe this initiative 
will weigh on AB InBev’s operating margin in the short term as executive 
management may feel incentivised to focus on astronomical revenue growth 
regardless of cost. Other risks, in our view, are related to the continuing 
execution of the SABMiller transaction, competitive dynamics in EM and further 
deterioration of volumes in developed markets. 
 
 









§ Latin America 
AB InBev realised $ 22.4 billion of revenue (39.6% of total) and $ 10.3 billion 
of normalised EBITDA (46.6% of total) in Latin America during 2017. Inkwood 
Research estimates the total 2017 market size to be $ 94.6 billion, which 
translates into a market share of 23.7% for AB InBev, and to grow at a 3.1% 
2017-2025 CAGR.  
Within Latin America, we are particularly optimistic about Peru, Ecuador, Brazil 
and most of Central America (based on population aged between 18 and 40 and 
real GDP expectations). We expect AB InBev to lose some market share in 
Colombia after Heineken’s joint venture with Postobon and CCU launches its 
planned three million hectolitre brewery in April 2018. Brazil is the largest 
individual contributor within the Latin American segment (according to official 
company communication; exact figures not reported). We believe developments 
in Brazil will have a significant impact on AB InBev’s share price as it is this 
market that due to a political and economic crisis has caused investors most 
distress over the past years. Now that the real GDP contractions (3.8% and 3.6% 
in 2015 and 2016 respectively; growth of 1.0% in 2017 & growth of 1.9-2.6% p.a. 
expected in 2018-2019) are behind us and the competitive environment has 
improved, we see significant room to realise margin expansion and return 
towards sustainable volume growth. AB InBev has strengthened its brands 
and distribution network in Brazil over the past two years, putting itself in a good 
position when the industry recovers. On one hand it was able to lower price 
points for some of its mainstream brands without margin pressure through the 
introduction of returnable glass bottles (RGBs) in off-trade channels, on the other 
hand it successfully raised price points for Budweiser and Corona – both of which 
have seen double digit growth over the past year and now make up for ~10% of 
overall Brazil volumes. In addition to further tailoring its brand portfolio to Brazil’s 
massive income inequality (Gini coefficient of 51.3), AB InBev has increased the 
utilisation rate of its local brewing footprint by scoring production and distribution 
licenses for Craft Brew Alliance’s (CBA) flagship brands (i.e. Kona’s Longboard 
Lager and Big Wave Golden Ale). The second half of 2017 showed that the 
anticipated rebound in Brazil has started to take off, showing a 20.4% 
organic EBITDA increase, compared to the same period in 2016. We believe that 
AB InBev will continue to profit from a recovery in disposable income (assuming 
that the expected real GDP growth will drive disposable income growth) over the 
next 2-3 years. Futhermore, we believe a recovery of the real in terms of US 
dollars (fallen by 14.3% over the past 12 months, ~50% over the past seven 
 
 








years) may drive significant margin expansion in Brazil over the next 3-5 years 
(although we don’t account for this directly in our model given the complexity of 
tangible evidence).  
Given it’s a dominant market position of nearly one fifth in Latin America, we 
expect revenue growth to be more or less in line with the projected market 
growth over the long-term. Both in the short- and long-term, we believe most 
market growth to be price-driven a result of premiumisation, as there is a clear 
trend observable towards the consumption of import and high-end beer. Over the 
next two years, we believe 150 bps incremental volume growth p.a. (in 
comparison to market growth) will be captured through price level optimisation 
(see previous comments regarding the introduction of RGBs and double-digit 
growth for Budweiser and Corona). With regards to cost efficiency, we believe 
the decrease in operational costs – predominantly in Brazil – will translate itself 
into a reduction of COGS as a percent of revenue to 32% in 2021 (through the 
optimisation of the utilisation rate as a result of the CBA contract and incremental 
organic volume growth). This would materialise in a gross margin expansion of 
150 bps over the next four years. SG&A as a percent of revenue is expected 
decrease 200 bps to 28% in 2021 (one-off costs related to the introduction of 
RGBs and the CBA licensing contract are coming to an end) –  realising EBIT 
margin expansion of 350 bps over the next four years. After the Brazilian 
economic situation is sorted out and the focus shifts back towards 
premiumisation of the Latin American beer market, we believe SG&A as a 
percent of revenue to revert back to its 2013-2017 average of 29.8% driven by 
increased marketing spending to stay ahead of Heineken – contracting EBIT 
margins with 190 bps over 2021-2025.  
§ North America 
AB InBev realised $ 15.6 billion of revenue (27.6% of total) and $ 6.3 billion of 
normalised EBITDA (28.7% of total) in North America during 2017. The Brewer 
Association estimates the total 2017 market size to be $ 111.4 billion, which 
translates into a market share of 9.2% for AB InBev. The past five years have 
shown exceptional growth in the sale of craft beers – now accounting for 23.3% 
of the total North American beer market. Modor Intelligence projects the market 
to grow at a 4.7% 2018-2023 CAGR.  
As a result of a persistent decline in AB InBev’s North American volumes (there 
have been only eight quarters with volume growth since 2010), investors have 
grown doubtful whether AB InBev will ever be able to turn this trend with nearly 
all market growth realised in the highly fragmented craft beer segment (in which 
we believe AB InBev lacks). In the USA alone, 98% of all operating breweries are 
 
 








small and independently owned craft breweries. AB InBev has acquired 10 
formerly independent craft brewers starting with Goose Island in 2011. There 
have been some initiatives such as the Brews Studs-organised boycott of brands 
acquired by AB InBev that indicated resistance from a growing cult following of 
North American craft beers. In 2017, AB InBev laid of ~90% of its High-End 
division – responsible for its craft beer activities – stating that it will start to focus 
on organic growth from its current network.  
We project North American volume to decline at a decelerating rate as High 
End, the fast-growing craft segment, becomes a larger portion of the pie (current 
figures unreported) through continued strong organic growth while Bud Light and 
Budweiser, brands that are in rapid decline in the North American market, 
become a smaller portion of the pie. In addition to decelerating volume declines 
from 300 bps in 2018 to 100 bps in 2025, we expect prices to raise slightly 
slower than expected inflation – 75 bps lower than the expected average 
2018-2025 inflation of ~2.2% – to account for our view that price increases 
exceeding the inflation rate have reached a point of saturation (based on the 
decelerating rate of price hikes) and the unlikely event that price deterioration 
occurs from MillerCoors increasing its reinvestment rate in North America (stated 
during the annual meeting of shareholders; we consider price deterioration 
unlikely as AB InBev has been able to do the opposite i.e. increasing its average 
price level at a 2010-2017 CAGR of 2.2%, higher than the average 2010-2017 
inflation rate of 1.7% while drastically increasing its reinvestment rate over the 
same period, according to management comments). However, we are confident 
in management’s expectation that AB InBev will continue to be able to maintain 
profit levels more or less flat through cost and product mix efficiencies. 
Given the impressive COGS reductions (please note that it is difficult to 
determine the exact contributors as COGS and SG&A are not broken down 
further on the segment-level) that have been realised since 2010, we expect 
further efficiency improvements to come from SG&A rationalisation as these 
have grown significantly over the past few years – with management Incurring 
incremental marketing expenses in an attempt to turn the tide with Bud Light and 
Budweiser (with very little success) – and a falling utilisation rate of its brewing 
facilities since 2010 (~20%, own estimates based on persistent volume declines 
without significant blue-collar layoffs). AB InBev has been reluctant to implement 
operational improvement initiatives that could be looked upon unfavourably from 
a stakeholder’s perspective after making social commitments such as not to 
close any breweries (amongst other confidential terms) to the Teamsters union 
following the Anheuser-Bush acquisition. However, we believe AB InBev will 
accelerate initiatives such as reducing the number of shifts at sites that are 
 
 








underutilised and moving production lines to rationalise its brewing footprint 
now that the end of the current Teamsters contract is in sight (Feb-19). As a 
result, we believe SG&A reductions to drive EBIT margin expansion of 300 bps 
over 2018-2025 – to reach its 2007-2017 average of 25% in 2025 (better 
representative of the cost structure in absence of extreme measures to shift the 
tide with Bud Light and Budweiser and exceptional obligations towards the 
Teamsters union, in our view).  
§ EMEA 
AB InBev realised $ 10.3 billion of revenue (18.3% of total) and $ 3.3 billion of 
normalised EBITDA (15.2% of total) in the EMEA during 2017. Modor 
Intelligence estimates the total 2018 European market size to be $ 145.8 
billion, and to grow at a 4.3% 2018-2023 CAGR. Exact figures for the African 
and Middle East beer markets are scarce. Beverage Daily approximates market 
growth for the next two years to be 5% per annum in Southern and Central 
Africa and 3% per annum in North Africa and the Middle East. The Financial 
Times estimates the African beer market to be worth around $ 13.0 billion. 
Transparency Research projects the Middle East beer market to reach annual 
revenues of $ 4.8 billion by 2021.  
In Europe, AB InBev has hit a rough patch over the past decade (based on the 
assumption that the European contribution to the EMEA segment has been 
relatively constant over the 8 years prior to the SABMiller acquisition – the EMEA 
segment marked negative volume growth at a 2008-2015 CAGR of 8.5%) with 
consumer preferences shifting from beer towards spirits and healthier 
alternatives (a Barclays survey showed that beer as the preferred drink among 
18-29 year olds decreased from ~71% in 1993 to ~41% in 2013, whereas wine 
and liquor increased from ~14% to ~24% and ~13% to ~28% respectively; 
although these figures have become outdated, we are unable to provide definitive 
proof that this trend has discontinued). However, comparing the 2017A organic 
EBIT growth rates of AB InBev (13.2%) and Heineken (9.0%) to the equivalents 
of Diageo (6.4%) and Pernod Ricard (3.3%), indicates that the growth gap has 
been narrowing (note that we used consolidated figures as a proxy because of 
reporting restrictions). We believe this is a result of craft beer bringing beer back 
to the centre of attention. Going forward, we see the tide turning for AB InBev in 
Europe as it will further reap benefits form its investments in the growing craft 
segment (e.g. 2016 acquisition of the Bosteels Brewery which owns one of the 
leading craft beers – Tripel Karmeliet – and the 2016 acquisition of the Ginette 
Brewery which taps into the promising organic craft segment), its strong position 
in the international premium segment (which in our view should perform well 
 
 








now that adjusted gross disposable income per capita has started to grow again 
i.e. 1.4% in 2017 compared to a decrease of 0.3% in 2016) and further adoption 
of no-alcohol and low-alcohol beer (we believe sales to have grown 
spectacularly over the past 2-3 years based on the data we have seen so far –  
+40% estimated YoY growth in the UK for example – now that global brewers 
seem to have cracked the right taste profile after years of R&D investments). 
Logically, we see the latter growth driver have a significant impact on the long-
term value of AB InBev. During the 17Q4 earning call, CEO Carlos Britto stated 
that no-alcohol and low-alcohol beer now makes up ~8% of the company’s total 
portfolio and that the goal is to realise 20% of volume sold in this category by 
2025. We belief AB InBev is positioned particularly well (currently 15 no/low-
alcohol brands, introduction of non-alcohol variants of core brands such as 
Budweiser – Budweiser Prohibition – and Corona – Corona Cero). According to 
Heineken, which reported great success with the recent introduction of Heineken 
0.0, no/low-alcohol beer volume is not directly sourced from beer but rather from 
soft drinks in adult consumption occasions. Furthermore, we believe this category 
will be margin accreditive as it sells close to beer price points (average price of 
Heineken 0.0 in NL supermarkets is € 2.2 per litre whereas regular Heineken is 
sold at € 2.7 per litre; comparison based on packages with six servings; 
supermarkets included based on the BierNet.nl database) but isn’t subject to 
excise tax. 
In Africa, AB InBev is experiencing a transformational period following the 
acquisition of SABMiller, which has greatly increased its exposure to the African 
continent. SABMiller operates in 17 African countries directly and another 21 
through an association with the French drinks group Castel. As a result of this 
transaction, the African beer market has become extremely concentrated with AB 
InBev and Heineken accounting for approximately two-thirds of the profit pool. In 
comparison to other developing markets, most volume growth is derived from the 
value-for-money segment rather than from premiumisation. This has put a lot of 
downward pressure on the profit pool in recent years. However, AB InBev has 
been able to extract some value in this segment recently as SABMiller’s has 
always cherished affordability through large packs, the use of cheaper locally 
sourced ingredients and price increases below inflation. Heineken, on the other 
hand, has historically been behind the curve within the value-for-money segment 
in an attempt to avoid undermining its large profit pool built on premium brands. 
We believe it is unlikely that AB InBev would take action to change SABMiller’s 
successful affordability strategy in Africa but do account for increasing low-price 
competition in our forecasts now that Heineken has shown initial signs of a shift 
towards the value-for-money segment. In South Africa especially, we expect AB 
 
 








InBev to continue losing some market share to Heineken given its accelerating 
efforts to increase market penetration in the main land and the volume impact 
that may result from AB InBev’s experiment to conduct an initial premiumisation 
push with increased price ladders for Budweiser and Corona (management 
comments; magnitude is unclear at this time). The rest of the African continent is 
more business as usual in our view. The dominating market position in the value-
for-money segment –  inherited from SABMiller – in combination with increasing 
economic momentum across several key markets should allow for a return to 
sustainable volume growth. We do expect price pressures to remain present 
as the competitive emphasis shifts towards the value-for-money segment and the 
increased production capacity from AB InBev’s new mega breweries opening 
later this year (Nigeria and Tanzania) amongst planned expansionary 
investments of Diageo and Heineken in their respective African production 
facilities.  
Not much is known about AB InBev’s presence, or lack thereof, in the Middle 
East. AB InBev gained a 24% stake in Anadolu Efes, the largest Turkish brewery 
with some distribution activities in the Middle East, through the SABMiller 
acquisition but has not yet stated its intentions going forward. We believe AB 
InBev will only shift its focus to the Middle East after it is able to sort out volume 
issues in North America, the SABMiller integration has been fully digested and 
competitive dynamics have matured in Africa and APAC. Although we recognise 
some untapped potential, we steer away from forecasting specific scenarios as 
long as management does not set any guidelines. Furthermore, we believe the 
market size (projected to reach $ 4.8 billion by 2021) of the Middle East 
subsegment to be rather negligible in comparison to the European ($ 145.8 
billion) and African ($ 13.0 billion) subsegments. Nevertheless, we will keep a 
very close look at new developments.  
We project EMEA volumes to remain flat in 2018 after which they will slowly 
accelerate on the back of African volume growth overshadowing the fall in 
European volumes to 100 bps in 2022. In 2022-2025, we believe the European 
no/low-alcohol beer market will have grown large enough to contribute 50 bps 
volume growth per annum. To account for the ever-growing African value-for-
money segment and intense competitive dynamics in European markets, we 
project a conservative price increase of 100 bps p.a. across the EMEA 
segment. AB InBev’s $ 3.2 billion expected synergies (66.7% has been captured 
so far) from integrating SABMiller’s organisational structure are expected to drive 
460 bps gross margin expansion over the next three years as well as an 
additional 170 bps EBIT margin expansion over the next five years, in line 
with management comments. Furthermore, we expect the rise of no/low-alcoholic 
 
 








beer predominantly in Europe to drive gross margin expansion of 50 bps p.a. 
in 2022-2025. However, we believe this will only translate itself in EBIT margin 
expansion of 25 bps in 2022-2025 as AB InBev will have to increase its 
marketing efforts to achieve its ambitious goals in this product category (i.e. 20% 
of volume sold by 2025) – especially taking into consideration that Heineken and 
Carlsberg also view the no/low-alcohol beer segment as a key value lever over 
the next decade.  
§ Asia Pacific 
AB InBev realised $ 7.8 billion of revenue (13.8% of total) and $ 2.7 billion of 
normalised EBITDA (12.2% of total) in APAC during 2017. Modor Intelligence 
estimates the total 2017 market size to be $ 196.1 billion, which translates into 
a market share of 4.0% for AB InBev, and to grow at a 9.7% 2017-2023 CAGR.  
We believe that the APAC segment offers exceptional prospects. In December 
2017, AB InBev opened Asia’s largest brewery, capable of producing 15 million 
hectolitres of beer per annum (more than doubling its local production capacity – 
according to our estimates) to prepare for an upswing in demand which has 
already shown itself with a strong volume uptick in 4Q17 (12.1%). Contrary to 
other EMs, the APAC beer market is still largely fragmented without a clear 
leader. In terms of volume, China is the largest beer market in the world (~23%) 
and the dominating contributor to the APAC segment (~66%). We believe that 
China offers the biggest opportunity for premiumisation due to Chinese 
consumers’ obsession with luxury goods (McKinsey demonstrated that Chinese 
households spend twice as much on luxury goods than their French or Italian 
counterparts; in addition, the number of Chinese millionaires is expected to 
surpass that of any other nation by the end of this year), the enormous 
urbanisation (60% of the Chinese population is expected to live in cities by 2030 
– compared to 45% in 2010 and 13% in 1950) that is taking place and the fact 
that the premium segment is still a fraction of neighbouring countries such as 
Taiwan and Hong Kong (international premium segment represents ~7% of the 
Chinese beer market whereas this is 30-50% in Taiwan and Hong Kong). An 
example would be the remarkable success of Budweiser, which now accounts for 
more than half of the international premium segment in China. There are 
indications that China is also quickly developing a super-premium segment. 
During the 2017HY investors conference call, CEO Carlos Brito – CEO said 
“Three or four years ago our guys in China said at some point there will be a 
super-premium segment and we need to lead that as well. So, we separated the 
route to market, we did everything that we had to do in order to create the 
 
 








infrastructure. We got the brands and now you look at Stella, Corona, and 
Hoegaarden, they are growing at triple digits, and with very high margins.”  
Given recent efforts, we project AB InBev to outperform the market at a 
decelerating rate in 2018 (+150 bps) to 2019 (+30 bps) to account for the initial 
impact of the new facility and expected demand uptick, after which we expect 
growth to slow down gradually (30 bps p.a.) to 8.2% in 2025 as the market 
matures. A growing part (30% in 2018 to 64% in 2015) of our projected revenue 
growth is price-driven in line with accelerating premiumisation and super-
premiumisation. In our opinion, fulfilling the ambition to become APAC’s number 
one beer company will require additional investments in marketing and 
selling expenses as Heineken and China Resources Enterprise have similar 
ambitions. We account for these increasing competitive dynamics by 
forecasting EBIT margin contractions of 100 bps p.a. in 2018-2020. 
General risks 
Notwithstanding economic cyclicality, we believe credit and FX related risks to 
pose the largest threat of adversely impacting AB InBev’s share price over the 
next 5-10 years. Furthermore, we believe changing competitive dynamics, both 
from independent brewers as from large competitors, to require some additional 
enclosure. 
 Credit 
Even though AB InBev’s net debt of $ 98.5 billion in an economic environment 
with tightening monetary policies may sound ludicrous to the defensive investor, 
actual credit risk is limited (~95% of net debt is locked in at a fixed interest 
rate). In addition, net debt paydown has exceeded bond redemptions since the 
SABMiller acquisition, making it unlikely that AB InBev will have to issue debt at a 
higher interest rate.  
We expect the deleveraging process towards AB InBev’s target net debt-to-
EBITDA ratio of 2 to be smoothed out over the next eight years to accommodate 
headroom for investments and avoid significant dividend cuts – a rather sensitive 
topic given the $ ~102 billion that controlling shareholders and executive 
management have tied up in AB InBev’s stock. However, we do believe that a 
slight dividend reduction is inevitable but is unlikely to negatively impact the stock 
price as the benefit of relieved investors’ concerns outweighs the temporary loss 
in fixed income. We have accounted for this by decreasing the payout ratio by 
14.5% in 2018 and 10% in 2019, after which it will recover to its current levels 
(relative to normalised operating profit) – allowing AB InBev to reach its target net 
debt-to-EBITDA ratio in 2025.  
 
 









AB InBev has exposure to a broad basket of currencies through its global 
operations and reports earnings in US dollars while its primary listing is in 
euros. Financial and share price performance is therefore subject to currency 
fluctuations. ~64% of gross debt is denoted in US dollars, ~28% in euros with the 
remainder split across a basket of EM currencies. Although unreported, we 
believe it is safe to assume that a significant part of COGS across EMs are US 
dollar linked, which can create gross margin volatility when the US dollar moves 
relative to other currencies.  
 Competitive dynamics 
  International competition 
Geographical overlap between large brewers has drastically increased 
(SABMiller acquisition, massive investments of Heineken and Diageo in Africa, 
etc.). In our opinion, this does not pose a direct risk as the process has been 
relatively smooth and gradual. The most significant confrontation has been 
between AB InBev and Heineken (mainly in LatAm and Africa; see Segments). 
However, given both companies track-record of focusing on value creation 
(+10% 10yr average ROIC) and brand development (7/10 most valuable beer 
brands owned by AB InBev; 2/10 owned by Heineken), we do not see it to be in 
either company’s interest to break current competitive dynamics.  
  Independent competition 
In terms of local competition, it is crucial to differentiate between developed 
markets and EMs. In the US, AB InBev has experienced its fair share of market 
loss to independent, craft breweries (exact market share loss not available; AB 
InBev’s total US volume has fallen with a 2010-2017 CAGR of 2.1%). The craft 
beer segment has grown from ~5% in 2005 to 23.4% in 2016 (in terms of 
revenue) – 2017 marked a net increase of ~1000 craft breweries. In Europe, a 
similar phenomenon has occurred but to a lesser extent (less concentrated beer 
market – no exact figures, estimation based on volume of top three brewers; 
different beer culture – much more variety historically).  
AB InBev, Heineken and Diageo have been relatively proactive in the EM craft 
segment. We believe AB InBev is unlikely to commit the same mistake it made in 
the US (dismissing the craft phenomenon in the early 2000s) based on the recent 
acquisitions of the Bogota Beer Company in Colombia, Boxing Cat in China and 
Colorado in Brazil. While competition is still relatively benign, it has definitely 
increased over the last few years with EM beer markets (excl. APAC) becoming 
relatively concentrated compared to developed peers (~75% market share for 
 
 








Heineken and AB InBev in LatAm; no exact figures available for Africa). In our 
view, the absence of easy credit in many EMs will continue to hinder growth in 
the independent craft segment, especially taking into account that much more 
beer volume is sold outside of urban areas (degree of urbanisation), making it 
difficult to operate without an established production footprint and distribution 
network.  
Valuation 
At the current price levels, AB InBev’s stock is significantly undervalued. Both its 
intrinsic and relative valuation indicate prices by which double-digit returns are to 
be expected. We believe AB InBev’s intrinsic value per share to be € 117.4 
(43.7% above the current level) whereas the median forward-looking price-to-
earnings multiple of AB InBev’s peer group suggests a share price of € 106.3 
(30.2% above the current level).  
DCF  
We estimate the intrinsic value per share at € 117.4 – which, in our opinion is a 
fair 12-month target price. Including dividend estimates, this would work out to a 
total 12-month shareholders’ return of 48.7%.  
    WACC 
  









 1,7% €        151.0 €        127.5 €         109.5 €          95.1 €          83.5 
2.2% €        161.9 €        133.7 €         112.9 €          96.9 €          84.2 
2.7% €        177.5 €        142.1 €         117.4  €          99.1 €          85.1 
3.2% €        201.8 €        154.2 €        123.5 €        102.0 €          86.1 
3.7% €        244.6 €        173.0 €        132.2 €        106.0 €         87.5 
 
    WACC 
  








 5,5% €        143.0 €        114.7 €           94.9 €          80.2 €          68.9 
6.5% €        162.9 €        130.5 €         107.9 €          91.1 €          78.2 
7.5% €        177.5 €        142.1 €         117.4  €          99.1 €          85.1 
8.5% €        188.6 €        151.0 €        124.7 €        105.3 €          90.3 
9.5% €        198.2 €        158.6 €        131.0 €        110.5 €         94.8 
 
§ WACC 
We have first valued AB InBev using a DCF model. This required us to determine 
the expected return that all investors – equity and debt – expect to earn for 
providing their capital to AB InBev. The blended cost of capital will allow us to 
 
 








uncover whether AB InBev is actually creating (or destroying) value – and to 
which extent. To compute a reasonable discount rate, we broke our calculations 
down to its core components: the expected cost of equity, the expected after-
tax cost of debt and the expected target capital structure. 
 Cost of equity 
In order to estimate AB InBev’s cost of equity, we have determined an 
approximation for the expected return of the entire stock market and 
measured company risk using the capital asset pricing model (CAPM).  
 Expected stock market return 
To account for the significant influence of the prevalent rate of inflation on the 
expected return of the entire stock market, we estimated the expected return by 
adding a historical risk premium to the normalised risk-free rate – rather than 
using a simple average of historical stock market returns.  
E. Dimson, P. Marsh and M. Staunton (2006) estimated the equity risk premium 
for 17 countries and a broad index over a 106-year interval. The authors research 
revealed that annualised stock market returns for Belgium (in which AB InBev is 
headquartered) between 1900 and 2005 were 2.4% – the lowest of the tested 
sample set. As we believe the cost of equity of AB InBev should reflect global 
stock market returns, using the historical stock market returns of Belgium would 
be negligent. As a countermeasure, we have used the 17 countries (Belgium, 
Australia, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, 
Netherlands, Norway, South Africa, Spain, Switzerland, UK, US) data set of E. 
Dimson, P. Marsh and M. Staunton (2006) as a proxy for the global stock market. 
Taking 10-year US Treasury yields – which we believe is most representative of 
our sample – as the risk-free asset (please note that we use a different forward-
looking risk-free rate to adjust for the impact of monetary policy), results in an 
annualised equity risk premium of 4.7% according to the geometric mean or 
6.1% according to the arithmetic mean.  
While the arithmetic mean is considered best for perfectly measured average 
returns, compounding annual returns also compounds the estimation errors, 
making it vulnerable to overestimation. D. C. Indro and W. Y. Lee (1997) 
demonstrated that the empirically documented presence of negative 
autocorrelation in long-horizon stock returns magnifies the upward bias inherent 
to the use of arithmetic averages and downward bias inherent to the use of 
geometric averages as estimates of long-run expected returns and risk 
premiums. The authors showed that an average of the arithmetic and geometric 
averages contains a smaller bias and is a more efficient estimator of long-run 
expected returns. In line with the authors’ results, we averaged our annualised 
 
 








equity premiums obtained through E. Dimson, P. Marsh and M. Staunton’s 
(2006) methodology, leaving us with a market risk premium of 5.4% – prior to 
adjustments for survivorship bias. 
Although it is often argued that market risk premiums have dropped over time, Z. 
Bodie (2002) and McKinsey (2015) showed that a simple regression does not 
confirm this. We argue in favour of basing our risk premium on a total time period 
that is as long as possible rather than using a shorter period that includes the 
most recent 12 years. We do believe a slight adjustment for survivorship bias is 
mandatory. E. Dimson, P. Marsh and M. Staunton (2006) demonstrated that the 
arithmetic annual return exceeded the 17-country composite return by 0.8% in 
real terms. Using this figure as a proxy for the survivorship premium, we estimate 
the market risk premium to be 4.6% – post adjustments.  
In line with our argumentation that the 10-year US Treasury yield is best 
representative of a risk-free asset for the 17-country sample used to determine 
our market risk premium as well as the facts that AB InBev’s cash flows are 
denominated in US dollars – McKinsey (2015) suggest to always use government 
bond yields denominated in the same currency as the company’s cash flow to 
estimate the risk-free rate – and that the majority of its gross debt (~64%) is 
denominated in US dollars, we use the 10-year US Treasury yield to maturity as 
the foundation for the risk-free rate estimation. While we recognise that choosing 
a bond’s duration that matches the maturity of each cash flow separately is the 
most theoretically sound approach, we argue in favour of using 10-year bonds for 
all cash flows to limit room for estimation errors and guarantee enough liquidity to 
correctly represent the risk-free rate. However, we do believe it is necessary to 
eliminate the impact of post-financial crisis monetary policies (such as zero-
bound interest rates and quantitative easing) which has fueled some irregularities 
between the relationship of interest rates on government bonds and market 
valuations of equities. To account for this, and our confidence in AB InBev’s 
ability to generate perpetual cash flows, we use a synthetic risk-free rate based 
on the historical average real yield to maturity of the 10-year US treasury 
bond and the long-run expected inflation rate. Over the past 16 years (note 
that the 16-year period was selected because of data restrictions; we would 
prefer an even longer period if possible), the average real 10-year US treasury 
yield was 1.1%. Adding this to our expected long-run inflation rate of 2.5% results 














    Real yield to maturity 
  








n  1,5% 2.4% 2.5% 2.6% 2.7% 2.8% 
2.0% 2.9% 3.0% 3.1% 3.2% 3.3% 
2.5% 3.4% 3.5% 3.6% 3.7% 3.8% 
3.0% 3.9% 4.0% 4.1% 4.2% 4.3% 
3.5% 4.4% 4.5% 4.6% 4.7% 4.8% 
 
Combing our estimations of the appropriate historical market risk premium (4.6%) 
and of the appropriate risk-free rate (3.6%) leads to an expected market return 
of 8.2%.  
    Market risk premium 









2.6% 5.2% 6.2% 7.2% 8.2% 9.2% 
3.1% 5.7% 6.7% 7.7% 8.7% 9.7% 
3.6% 6.2% 7.2% 8.2% 9.2% 10.2% 
4.1% 6.7% 7.7% 8.7% 9.7% 10.7% 
4.6% 7.2% 8.2% 9.2% 10.2% 11.2% 
 
 Company risk 
In order to account for AB InBev’s incremental risk (defining risk as the extent to 
which its stock moves up and down in relation to the stock market), we have 
calculated its expected beta. We based our approximation on a long-term sector 
analysis to limit the impact of idiosyncratic risk and temporary market distortions. 
After careful analysis of the peer group, we argue in favour of using the median 
of the unlevered 52-week rolling betas of AB InBev and Heineken over the past 
five years as the foundation of our expected beta. We believe the remaining 
brewers lack size and geographical diversity – which presents itself in higher 
betas (and volatility) on average – to truly represent the same operational risk 
profile as AB InBev and question the value of including other beverage or staples 
companies. In line with this reasoning, we restricted the time frame to five years 
as we believe the AB InBev to have changed fundamentally (due to increased 
size). 
We estimated the beta of our sample companies by dividing the covariance of its 
weekly returns during the prior year and the MSCI All Country World Index 
(ACWI) with the variance of the MSCI ACWI. We believe the MSCI ACWI – with 
significant exposure to 23 developed and 24 emerging markets – best reflects the 
market as a whole (we used the Euronext 100 as a sanity check and the 
differences were negligible). As a result of persist trading volumes in AB InBev 
 
 








and Heineken’s stock, we felt safe using weekly returns rather than monthly 
returns (we consider the downward bias inherent to illiquid securities to be 
irrelevant). Our choice for annual rolling betas (i.e. including the most recent 52 
weekly returns for each data point) was made on the assumption that it would 
allow us to gain better insights into temporary fluctuations compared to longer 
time inclusions. Additionally, the use of the median of our annual rolling betas 
over a five-year period to obtain an approximation for the expected beta 
significantly reduces the impact of which period is exactly included.  
The output of our first step, obtaining the levered one-year rolling betas over the 
most recent five-year period for Heineken and AB InBev, was in line with our 
expectations (i.e. AB InBev’s higher median debt-to-equity ratio resulted in a 
higher median levered beta). In order to eliminate the impact of leverage – 
allowing for easier comparison – we converted each beta into its unlevered 
counterpart. Doing so reduced the difference between both companies’ median 
beta (from 23.3% to 3.4%) but also decreased the correlation between the full 
sample set (from 0.86 to 0.71). While this surprised us initially, we believe this is 
most likely a result of idiosyncratic shocks. As both companies are each other’s 
biggest competitor, in our view, what is good for one’s stock price often has an 
adverse impact on the others (e.g. Heineken’s stock price fell while AB InBev’s 
stock price increased on the news that the latter will be the official partner for the 
FIFA World Cup).  
Next, we took the average of Heineken and AB InBev’s unlevered rolling betas to 
account for nonrepeatable events. We levered the median beta (0.42) to the 
expected target capital structure of AB InBev (see target capital structure section) 
resulting in a levered expected beta of 0.53 – prior to final adjustments. Finally, 
as we belief AB InBev to be a going concern with persistent perpetual cash flows, 
we smooth our beta to account for mean regression – which M. Blume (1975) 
amongst others demonstrated. Utilising a simple smoothing process (in 
accordance with Bloomberg’s standard methodology; 0.33+0.67*unsmoothed 
beta) results in an expected levered beta of 0.69.  
 After-tax cost of debt 
In order to estimate AB InBev’s after-tax cost of debt, we have determined an 
approximation for the expected return on its debt and valued the interest tax 
shield using the forward-looking marginal tax rate.  
 Expected return on debt  
Although AB InBev has a net debt-to-EBITDA ratio of 4.6x, the company is rated 
investment-grade by Fitch (BBB; lower medium grade; 05/2018), S&P (A-; upper 
medium grade; 05/2017) and Moody’s (A3; upper medium grade; 05/2017). AB 
 
 








InBev has a total of 97 debt instruments outstanding. Approximately 95% of its 
net debt is locked in at a fixed rate. In terms of FX, 64% of gross debt is 
denominated in US dollars, 28% is denominated in euros and the remaining 8% 
is split across a large basket of currencies. AB InBev has an interest coverage 
ratio of 2.9x.  
Using the blended yield to maturity of all outstanding debt instruments as a proxy 
for expected return is complicated in AB InBev’s case as part of its debt structure 
is composed of instruments with embedded options. We argue in favour of using 
the average yield to maturity for a basket of long-term bonds with the same 
credit rating as proxy for AB InBev’s implied yield on long-term debt to 
overcome this matter. In accordance with A. Damodran’s (2018) research on 
average yield to maturities for large-cap non-financial companies (defined as 
listed enterprises with a market cap exceeding $ 5 billion), we use a 1.27% 
default spread for BBB ratings (Fitch) and a 1.13% default spread for A3/A- 
ratings (S&P and Moody’s). We appoint twice the amount of weight to the 1.27% 
default spread compared to the 1.13% default spread as this rating was restated 
more recently. In addition, our view is further confirmed by A. Damodran’s (2018) 
research into synthetic ratings – I which he studied the relationship between 
interest coverage ratios and appropriate credit ratios for non-financial large-cap 
companies. According to the author, AB InBev’s interest coverage ratio of 2.9x is 
an applicable proxy for a 1.27% default spread. While we recognise the flaws of 
this approach, it does increase our confidence that the risk of a bias in the credit 
agencies’ ratings for AB InBev is limited and that a 2-to-1 weighting in favour of 
the 1.27% default spread is a theoretically sound approach. Combining our risk-
free rate (3.6%) with our weighted average default spread (1.2%) leads to a pre-
tax cost of debt of 4.8% – which we use as proxy for the expected return on AB 
InBev’s debt.  
 Interest Tax Shield 
To move from the pre-tax cost of debt to the after-tax cost of debt, we have 
valued AB InBev’s tax shield. Although AB InBev is headquartered in Belgium, 
we believe the use of the US marginal tax rate is better justified given the 
dominance of debt denominated in US dollars in its debt structure (~64%). The 
recent Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA) reduced the US federal income tax rate 
from 35% to 21%. Further accounting for state taxes gives us a marginal tax 
rate of 25.7% (we have used the simple average of state corporate income taxes 
due to the absence of data to compute more precise weights) – prior to forward-
looking adjustments. Benchmarking this rate with the OECD average of 23.8% 
and taking the political sensitivity of raising taxes into consideration, gives us 
sufficient confidence that this tax rate will be sustainable – rather than being 
 
 








dismissed as soon as a new president is elected. Furthermore, we argue that the 
probability of further tax cuts is negligible because of the significance of the US 
deficit (expected to surpass $1 trillion by 2020).  
In line with J. R. Graham and Lillian F. Mills (2007) findings that the statutory 
marginal tax rate overstates the future marginal tax rate because of rules related 
to tax loss carryforwards, tax loss carrybacks, investment tax credits and 
alternative minimum taxes, we apply a discount of 2.5% to the statutory rate. 
Although the authors calculated the impact to be a discount of ~5% on average, 
we still believe this to be too much for AB InBev as their findings were 
significantly impacted by smaller, less profitable companies. In the event that AB 
InBev didn’t possess such spectacular track-record of effective tax management 
– demonstrated by its effective tax rate of ~7-8% – we would consider this 
statutory tax discount to be irrelevant. Adjusting the marginal tax rate (25.7%) 
with 2.5% leads to a marginal tax rate of 23.1%. 
Applying the appropriate marginal tax rate (23.1%) to our pre-tax cost of debt 
(4.8%) leads to an expected after-tax cost of debt of 3.7%.  
 Target capital structure 
The acquisition of SABMiller has increased AB InBev’s financial leverage to 
excessive levels in comparison to the years prior to the acquisition. In our quest 
to determine an expected target capital structure, we have looked beyond the 
current situation to approximate market-based weights that are best in line with 
management’s financing philosophy, backed by historical evidence.  
AB InBev targets a net debt-to-EBITDA level of 2.0x – in which it has succeeded 
well historically (with the obvious exception following the SABMiller acquisition). 
In line with management statements, we believe deleveraging to be a core focus 
over the next years. According to our estimates, the target net debt-to-EBITDA 
should be achieved in 2025. To determine how this would translate itself in the 
relationship between the market value of equity and debt net of excess 
cash, we use the net debt-to-equity at market value of 2012-2015 as a guideline 
(the average net debt-to-EBITDA level was 2.0x during this period). If we expect 
AB InBev to revert to its target net debt-to-EBITDA level at similar market 
valuations as in 2012-2015 (as we expect over the next years; outlined in the 
comparables and investment thesis sections), the target capital structure should 
consist of 24.6% net debt and 75.4% equity at market value – on average, over 
the life of the business.  
Given the complexity of estimating a fair market value of AB InBev’s gross debt 
(i.e. significant presence of hybrid securities, substantial unquoted debt and 
some illiquid instruments with unclear embedded options), we argue in favour of 
 
 








using the carrying value – which is in line with our methodology used to 
determine the expected equity weighting – rather than using a discounted cash 
flow model to approximate the market value of its debt. AB InBev’s investment 
grade ratings (BBB by Fitch, A- by S&P and A3 by Moody’s) and strong interest 
coverage ratio (2.9x) confirm our belief that default risk is low. However, as 
interest rates have been rising rather quickly in the US (54 bps increase in the 
US 10-year yield YTD) and ~64% of gross debt is denominated in US dollars, it is 
likely that the market value of such debt has fallen. While we recognise the 
significance of this to its fullest extent, we believe accounting for such trend will 
result in assumptions that stretch the truth and may result in value distortions 
over the long-term that outweigh benefits that could be reaped in the short-term.  
§ Terminal value 
In our view, AB InBev’s main challenges and opportunities will outplay 
themselves to a sufficient extent over the next eight years (we used 2018-2025 
as the explicit forecast period) to restrict the amount of assumptions for the 
continuing value. From 2026, we expect AB InBev to grow at a relatively stable 
growth rate and achieve relatively constant returns on capital – which we will 
capture through a terminal value by using the value driver formula.  
 Growth rate 
The expected growth rate of free cash flows in perpetuity is, in our opinion, best 
determined by combining a thorough analysis of historical growth, growth during 
the explicit forecast period, the long-term outlook of the beer market (also other 
markets in which the company plans to expand, if applicable) and some logical 
reasoning as to which extent perpetual growth is feasible. We argue in favour of 
employing rather defensive assumptions – on which optimistic scenarios can be 
sensitised (its goes without explanation that the same should be done for 
pessimistic scenarios).  
 Historical 
Given AB InBev’s aggressive M&A activity over the past decade – which, in our 
opinion, has neared its natural limitations due to antitrust issues – we limit our 
historical analysis to organic growth. AB InBev has achieved global organic 
revenue growth at a 4.6% 2012-2017 CAGR. During this same period, AB InBev 
achieved organic EBIT growth at a 10.2% 2012-2017 CAGR. We argue in favour 
of focusing on organic revenue growth as we believe much of the discrepancy 
between organic revenue and EBIT growth has been driven by increasing 
economies of scale due to M&A activity – which we don’t consider sustainable in 
 
 








perpetuity. Furthermore, we do not see the added value in looking beyond 2012, 
as we believe AB InBev has changed a lot fundamentally since then.  
To put the 4.6% 2012-2017 CAGR into perspective, we obtained the same figure 
for the comparable companies (please refer to Appendix B for a description of the 
peer group) for which organic revenue growth figures are readily available. Such 
analysis shows a very bright picture for AB InBev – which outperformed its peer 
group with organic growth that was almost double of the group’s average (excl. 
AB InBev) of 2.9%. We believe much of this to be attributed to the cross-selling 
opportunities of AB InBev’s aggressive M&A strategy – which in our opinion, 
should be adjusted for.  
 Expected 
Going forward, we expect AB InBev to grow sales organically at a 3.2% CAGR 
2017-2025. Albeit a significant part of this can be attributed to expected cross-
selling opportunities as well (following the SABMiller integration). Furthermore, 
we do not account for expected M&A activity as we expect antitrust issues have 
made it nearly impossible to continue a strategy of accreditive M&A (additionally, 
we argue that it is infeasible to determine to which extent incremental 
acquisitions would add value without assumptions that are vulnerable to 
significant estimation errors). In line with its sheer size (market share of ~28% in 
terms of volume), we believe a downward adjustment on the 2012-2025 growth 
expectations should be made to account for the difficulty of sustaining growth 
over long periods. The European and US beer markets have taught us that 
market maturity can drastically increase competitive pressures from independent, 
craft breweries as purchasing power increases and consumer demand becomes 
more complex – for this reason we believe AB InBev’s sheer size to be more of a 
liability rather than the accommodating economies of scale to be an asset in 
terms of relative growth in perpetuity. Furthermore, we believe growth in the 
global beer market to slow down significantly as the APAC, Latin American and 
African markets mature (please note that we do not have access to market 
forecasts beyond 2025).  
Finally, using the 3.7% 2012-2025E revenue CAGR as a starting point (we 
consider the cost structure of 2025 sufficiently normalised to use a revenue 
approximation for FCF growth), we make adjustments for the 2012-2017 peer 
group average – motivated by mean reversion – of 2.9% (25 bps), the impact of 
cross-selling opportunities (25 bps), the limitations of growth due to sheer 
size (25 bps) and the global beer market slowing down (25 bps). While we 
consider the size of these (simplified) adjustments to be quite arbitrary due to the 
absence of data required to approximate their impact, we emphasise that we 
 
 








appoint limited value to our final perpetual growth rate of 2.7% (which is more in 
less in line with our expected long-term global inflation) but rather are interested 
in a scenario-based interpretation. 
 ROIC 
The expected return on new invested capital (after 2025) in perpetuity is, in our 
opinion, best determined by combining a historical analysis of the ROIC of AB 
InBev and closely related peers – on which we make an adjustment to account 
for changing competitive dynamics. Again, we argue in favour of employing 
conservative assumptions – on which scenarios can be sensitised.  
AB InBev ROIC has seen quite some irregularities in recent years. First, the net 
operating result took a significant hit in 2014 and 2015 – driven by negative FX 
effects (a sharp decline in the Brazilian real had settled the company with some 
bad hedges). In 2016, capital turnover decreased significantly (from 47.9% to 
23.0%) as a result of the SABMiller integration (net operating assets more than 
doubled). While the capital turnover ratio recovered partially to 29.9% in 2017, we 
expect gradual asset rationalisation over the next eight years to revert 
capital turnover back to 39.9% in 2025. We believe it is unlikely that pre-
SABMiller levels of ~45-50% will be reached again as, in our view, the increased 
magnitude of AB InBev’s makes it more difficult to manage net operating assets 
as efficiently as prior to the acquisition. Furthermore, we expect the after-tax 
operating margin to stay relatively constant around ~26-27%. 
        
An analysis of the comparable companies shows that AB InBev underperformed 
the peer group over the period 2012-2017 (7.0% compared to 10.1%) on this 
metric – as we would expect given the irregularities over this period (i.e. negative 
FX effects and SABMiller acquisition requiring some asset rationalisation). We 
believe the 5-year mean to add limited value as we see no clear trend between 
our subsegments in the comparable peer group (i.e. no clear distinction between 
beer, spirits and staples). Rather, we are interested in developments over time.  
 
 








The ROIC should be set in accordance with expected competitive dynamics. 
Economic theory suggests that competition will eliminate abnormal returns over 
time, as profits attract new market entrants – increasing competitive dynamics 
which contracts margins. Mauboussin (2007) confirmed this by showing that 
ROICs have a strong tendency to revert to the mean and that a persistent high 
ROIC (~10 years) is very rare – both for individual companies as well as sectors 
as a whole. Furthermore, F.M De Bondt and R.H. Thaler (1987) demonstrated 
that earnings growth itself is highly vulnerable to mean reversion. Although we 
believe a five-year period to be short a sample (given the impact of temporary 
market distortions), our peer group – with the average ROIC decreasing from 
11.8% in 2013 to 8.7% in 2017 – shows a similar trend.  
Finally, we do believe AB InBev to possess a sustainable competitive 
advantage which will allow it to earn returns on new invested capital (after the 
explicit forecast period) exceeding its blended cost of capital. However, we do not 
consider the 10.7% ROIC in 2025 to be sustainable in perpetuity. In our view, AB 
InBev’s brand value and economies of scale combined with high barriers to entry 
should allow the company to earn a return on new invested capital that 
exceeds its cost of capital by approximately ~1.5% - resulting in a perpetual 
return on invested capital of 7.5%. We emphasise that given the difficulty of 
obtaining a precise estimate for this variable, a scenario-based interpretation is 
crucial.  
 Sensitivity 
Applying the value driver formula with 2.7% perpetual growth and a return on 
new invested capital of 7.5% results in a terminal value of $ 255.4 billion (which 
represents ~67% of the total enterprise value). Although we argue in favour of 
thorough sensitivity analysis on all variables to get a good sense of each 
variable’s contribution to AB InBev’s valuation, we emphasise its crucial 
importance here due to the significant value contribution.  
    Perpetual ROIC 
  
 









 0,7% $ 217,0 billion $ 221,8 billion $ 225,4 billion $ 228,1 billion $ 230,3 billion 
1.7% $ 211.7 billion $ 226.2 billion $ 236.9 billion $ 245.1 billion $ 251.5 billion 
2.7% $ 203.2 billion $ 233.3 billion $ 255.4 billion $ 272.3 billion $ 285.6 billion 
3.7% $ 187.3 billion $ 246.5 billion $ 289.9 billion $ 323.1 billion $ 349.3 billion 














    Perpetual ROIC 









 0,7% 63,6% 64,2% 64,5% 64,8% 65,0% 
1.7% 63.1% 64.6% 65.7% 66.4% 67.0% 
2.7% 62.1% 65.3% 67.3% 68.7% 69.7% 
3.7% 60.2% 66.5% 70.1% 72.3% 73.8% 
4.7% 54.3% 69.3% 75.3% 78.5% 80.5% 
 
§ Enterprise value 
Now that we have determined our discount rate and continuing value, we are 
able to calculate the value of AB InBev’s core business – which we will use to 
compute the enterprise value by adding the value of nonoperating assets.  
We have discounted our perpetual free cash flows at the expected cost of capital 
using a mid-year convention – under the assumption that the cash flows are 
generated evenly throughout the year (which is more or less in line with what we 
have learned from quarterly reporting). Doing so, values the core business of 
AB InBev at $ 379.3 billion.  
In the calculation of our free cash flows, we were relatively conservative in what 
we have defined as nonoperating assets. In our view, the significance of AB 
InBev’s M&A activity defines it as a core element to its business (together with 
the production and distribution activities of beer, of course) – increasing the 
complexity of drawing a specific boundary between what should and should not 
be included in our free cash flow forecasts. In case of doubt, we have opted to 
include it in the core activities as, in our opinion, this leaves us less vulnerable to 
estimation errors. 
As a result, our noncore assets consist solely of excess pension assets. AB 
InBev has a surplus on its pension funds which it reports at market value – in line 
with IFRS guidelines – making a valuation rather easy. As these excess pension 
assets will lead to fewer required contributions in the future we will combine the 
value of the core business ($ 379.3 billion) with the value of the excess pension 
asset ($ 3.0 billion) – adjusted for tax (at the statutory marginal tax rate of 33%) 
to account for the tax treatment under Belgian law. Adding the value of the 
excess pension assets ($ ~2 billion; represents ~0.5% of the total enterprise 














§ Equity value 
As the final step of our valuation model, we subtract our net financial obligations 
to determine the value of AB InBev to its equity holders (which we use to derive 
our target stock price) – resulting in an equity value of $ 272.5 billion.  
To determine an intrinsic value per share, we divide the equity value ($ 272.5 
billion) by the number of undiluted shares outstanding (~1.9 billion) – resulting in 
a fair value target price of € 117.4 (after converting our values from US dollars 
to euros at the latest FX rate; AB InBev reports in US dollars while its primary 
listing is in euros). While this figure, in our view, best represents the intrinsic 
value per share of AB InBev at this time, we suggest a scenario-based 
interpretation of our key parameters to account for new developments going 
forward.   
    WACC 
  









 1,7% €        151.0 €        127.5 €         109.5 €          95.1 €          83.5 
2.2% €        161.9 €        133.7 €         112.9 €          96.9 €          84.2 
2.7% €        177.5 €        142.1 €         117.4  €          99.1 €          85.1 
3.2% €        201.8 €        154.2 €        123.5 €        102.0 €          86.1 
3.7% €        244.6 €        173.0 €        132.2 €        106.0 €         87.5 
 
    WACC 
  








 5,5% €        143.0 €        114.7 €           94.9 €          80.2 €          68.9 
6.5% €        162.9 €        130.5 €         107.9 €          91.1 €          78.2 
7.5% €        177.5 €        142.1 €         117.4  €          99.1 €          85.1 
8.5% €        188.6 €        151.0 €        124.7 €        105.3 €          90.3 
9.5% €        198.2 €        158.6 €        131.0 €        110.5 €         94.8 
 
    Perpetual ROIC 
  









 1,7% €          98.6  €        104.9 €         109.5 €        113.0 €        115.8 
2.2% €          97.0 €        106.2 €         112.9 €        118.1 €        122.1 
2.7% €          94.9 €        107.9 €         117.4  €        124.7 €        130.5 
3.2% €          92.1 €        110.2 €        123.5 €        133.7 €        141.7 















In our opinion, price-to-earnings (P/E) multiples are best suited to determine an 
indicative shareholders’ return over short-term periods for well-established 
companies such as AB InBev. Based on the 2018 forward-looking P/E ratio of AB 
InBev’s peer group (please refer to Appendix B), a stock price of € 100-110 
should be feasible within the next months. This would indicate a total 
shareholders’ return in excess of 15% over the next 6-24 months. To give a more 
precise example, reiterating the median forward-looking P/E multiple on AB 
InBev’s 2019E earnings provides a stock price of € 106.3 by 1Q19. This 
would result in a total shareholders’ return of 17.4% after accounting for a slight 
dividend reduction (dividend return of 3.6% in this scenario) to accommodate the 
deleveraging process.  
§ Current 
 
Comparing common valuation metrics with its peer group, AB InBev is priced 
rather conservatively – which should come as no surprise after three consecutive 
years of underperformance (compared to the MSCI Europe Consumers Staples 
Index). AB InBev trades well-below the median (represented by the dotted line in 
the chart below) on all included valuation metrics with the exception of the price-
to-sales ratio. A logical explanation is found in AB InBev’s superior profitability, 
realising a 2017A EBITDA margin of 38.0% compared to the peer group average 
of 24.3% and a 2017A profit margin of 16.3% compared to the peer group 
average of 11.7%, thus increased value of sales to its shareholders.  





AB InBev relative to the peer group ranges (2018F financials excl. P/B)
 
 









Since the 1Q08, AB InBev has only traded at a discount to the average 
normalised LTM P/E ratio of its peer group on the last trading day of three 
quarters (4Q08, 1Q09 and 1Q18). While, in our view, the first two occasions can 
be explained by a single factor – concerns about AB InBev’s level of financial 
leverage during a time of turbulent credit markets – the current situation appears 
to be much more complex. We believe AB InBev’s recent underperformance to 
be a result of an ever-growing combination of volume concerns in developed 
markets, economic contractions in Brazil, concerns about a high level of financial 
leverage in a tightening monetary environment, increased organisational 
complexity after the SABMiller acquisition and a loss of investor’s confidence as 
a result of three consecutive years of underperforming the MSCI Europe 
Consumer Staples Index (AB InBev outperformed this index consistently from 
2005 to 2014). However, while we agree with most concerns in the investment 
thesis section, we argue that current risks are overpriced into AB InBev’s 
stock. 
In our opinion, AB InBev’s 10-year average valuation premium of 30.3% 
compared to its peer group average is a result of its superior market positioning 
(i.e. high market shares in concentrated markets), its owner-operators culture 
demanding sustainable value creation for shareholders, its track-record of 
growing earnings fasters than its peers and its persistent high cash flow 
conversion. We believe a return to a valuation premium is justified as soon as 
investors get to see more evidence of the outlook in Brazil improving and 
evidence that AB InBev will continue to be able to keep profit up with declining 
volumes in North America. We do not expect these scenarios to uncover during 
the next months as investors will have to be assured over several reporting 
periods. However, we do believe that the first steps in the right direction have 
been taken and that if the trend continues, double-digit returns for the next 3-5 




















Appendix A provides an overview of key transformational events and our view on 
M&A activity going forward.  
 Ambev 
In 2004, Interbrew merged with Ambev in an all-stock deal and continued 
operating as InBev. Interbrew, the Belgian-based brewing company that was 
formed through the merger of Stella Artois and Piedboeuf in 1988, represented 
the largest European brewing group at the time of the Ambev acquisition. Ambev, 
on the other hand, was a Brazil-based brewing company that came forward out of 
the merger between Brahma and Antartica in 1999. Prior to the merger, Ambev 
was the largest South American brewing group, InBev at once became the 
largest brewer in the world with an approximate market share of 13% in terms of 
volume, leaving Anheuser-Bush, which was the largest brewer for several 
decades, and SABMiller, the second largest, behind it. Prior to the transaction, 
Interbrew was the third largest brewer and Ambev was the fifth largest brewer. 
Interbrew’s acquisition of Ambev resulted in synergies of approximately $ 300 
million through a combination of technical, procurement and administrative costs 
reductions, as well as commercial value creation such as cross-licensing of 
existing brands. Due to the all-stock structure of the transaction, InBev was able 
to maintain its rather conservative financial structure.  
 Anheuser-Bush 
In 2008, InBev acquired Anheuser-Bush, the largest US-based brewing company 
(2nd largest in the world), after a long unsolicited process, for approximately $ 52 
billion, which represented an EV of 12.4x LTM EBITDA. Post transaction, the 
company continued operating as Anheuser-Bush InBev. The acquisition 
significantly strengthened AB InBev’s position in the US and China, two countries 
where Anheuser-Bush held a dominant market position.  
InBev acquisition of Anheuser-Bush resulted in total synergies of approximately $ 
2.3 billion, 53% more than the budgeted synergies of $ 1.5 billion. The all-cash 
nature of the transaction increased AB InBev’s net debt-to-EBITDA ratio to 4.7x. 














 Grupo Modelo 
In 2012, AB InBev acquired Grupo Modelo, the largest Mexican brewing 
company, for approximately $ 20 billion. AB InBev already owned 50% of Grupo 
Modelo through the acquisition of Anheuser-Bush. The transaction value 
represented an enterprise value of 12.9x LTM EBITDA. Post transaction, AB 
InBev is the largest brewer in Latin America and owner of the flagship Corona-
brand. 
AB InBev’s acquisition of Grupo Modelo resulted in total synergies of 
approximately $ 1.1 billion. The $ 14 billion of new bank loans used to fund the 
all-cash transaction increased AB InBev’s net debt-to-EBITDA ratio to 2.2x. 
 SABMiller 
In 2016, AB InBev acquired SABMiller, the London-based brewing group with 
South African roots, through a tender offer for approximately $ 107 billion, which 
represented an enterprise value of 14.5x LTM EBITDA, in a combined cash and 
stock deal. SABMiller was the second largest brewer in the world prior to the 
transaction. Post transaction, AB InBev is good for an approximate global market 
share of 28% in terms of volume.  
AB InBev’s acquisition of SABMiller is expected to result in total synergies of 
approximately $ 3.2 billion, more than double its initial estimate. The additional 
debt used to finance the transaction increased AB InBev’s net debt-to-EBITDA 
ratio to 6.4x.  
 Expected M&A activity 
Given the substantial deleveraging required to reach AB InBev’s target net debt-
to-EBITDA ratio of 2.0x, we do not expect the next megadeal to take place within 
the next ~5 years. However, the exceptionally ambitious 2020 Dream Incentive 
Plan (i.e. a $ 350 million bonus programme paid out if annual revenue of $ 100 
billion is achieved before 2022) does not let us rule out the possibility of another 
transformational deal.  
The Coca-Cola Company, PepsiCo, Diageo have all been rumoured to be 
potential targets in the media and analyst reports. In our opinion, Diageo seems 
unlikely due to the potential antitrust issues with its beer assets. PepsiCo seems 
to be a better strategical fit than Coca-Cola due to its greater downstream 
integration and longstanding relationship with Ambev, which has bottling 
agreements with PepsiCo in Latin America. We believe an acquisition of Castel 
is more likely in the next years as timing would largely depend on the seller. AB 
InBev inherited a 20% stake in Castel with a right of first refusal on the 80% 
controlled by the Castel family through the SABMiller acquisition. Castel is one of 
 
 








the five largest brewers in Africa with a particularly strong footprint in Northern 
Africa, a region where AB InBev’s distribution network is relatively 
underdeveloped and which could be crucial in the battle with Heineken for a 
market leading position in the African continent.  
Appendix B 
Appendix B provides an overview of our selected peer group to benchmark AB 
InBev. In addition to global brewers, we have included global staples with 
significant beverage activities and global spirits. We restricted the weight of 
global spirits to half that of the other categories to reduce the impact of the 
element of substitution between spirits and beer.  
  Brewers 
 Heineken 
Heineken, founded in 1873, is the second largest brewing company in the world 
in terms of volume sold. The company produces its brands across ~165 
breweries and markets its brands in over 70 countries across all continents. Its 
portfolio of ~250 brands includes flagship brands such as Heineken, Amstel, 
Desperados, Sol, Tiger and Tecate. Heineken is headquartered in the 
Netherlands and employs ~75 thousand FTEs.  
Heineken realised € 21.9 billion of 2017A revenue on which it realised a 21.5% 
EBITDA margin and an 8.8% profit margin. It sold 218 million hectolitres of beer 
in 2017 and has a net debt-to-EBITDA ratio of 2.5x.  
 Carlsberg 
Carlsberg, founded in 1847, is the third largest brewing company in the world in 
terms of volume sold. The company markets its brands in over 100 countries 
across Europe and Asia. Its portfolio of ~500 brands includes flagship brands 
such as Carlsberg, Tuborg, Kronenbourg and Somersby. Carlsberg is 
headquartered in Denmark and employs ~41 thousand FTEs.   
Carlsberg realised DKK 61.8 billion of 2017A revenue on which it realised a 
21.1% EBITDA margin and an 2.0% profit margin. It sold 112 million hectolitres of 
beer in 2017 and has a net debt-to-EBITDA ratio of 1.5x.  
 Molson Coors Brewing Company 
Molson Coors, formed in 2005 through the merger of the Canadian Moors and 
the American Coors, is a large global brewing company. The company produces 
its brands across 31 breweries and markets its brands in over 50 countries 
across North America, Europe and APAC. Its portfolio of ~90 brands includes 
 
 








flagship brands such as Coors Light, Blue Moon, Miller Lite, Leinenkugel’s and 
Redd’s Apple Ale. Molson Coors is headquartered in the US and employs ~18 
thousand FTEs.  
Molson Coors realised $ 11.0 billion of 2017A revenue on which it realised a 
23.9% EBITDA margin and an 12.9% profit margin. It sold 23.1 million hectolitres 
of beer in 2017 and has a net debt-to-EBITDA ratio of 4.2x.  
 Royal Unibrew 
Royal Unibrew, formed in 1989 through the merger of the Danish Faxe, Ceres 
and Thor breweries, is a European brewing and beverages company. The 
company markets its brands across Scandinavia and Europe. Its portfolio 
includes flagship brands such as Royal, Lapin Kulta, Ceres and Faxe. Royal 
Unibrew is headquartered in Denmark and employs ~2.4 thousand FTEs.  
Royal Unibrew realised DKK 6.3 billion of 2017A revenue on which it realised a 
21.4% EBITDA margin and an 13.0% profit margin. It sold 9.7 million hectolitres 
of beer in 2017 and has a net debt-to-EBITDA ratio of 0.8x.  
  Staples 
 Nestlé 
Nestlé, formed in 1905 through the merger of the Anglo-Swiss Milk Company and 
Farine Lactée Henri Nestlé, is the largest food and beverages company in the 
world in terms of revenue. The company produces its brands across ~447 
production facilities and markets its brands in over 190 countries across all 
continents. Its portfolio of ~2 thousand brands includes flagship brands such as 
Kit Kat, Nescafe, Purina and San Pellegrino. Nestlé is headquartered in 
Switzerland and employs ~335 thousand FTEs.  
Nestlé realised CHF 89.8 billion of 2017A revenue on which it realised a 19.7% 
EBITDA margin and an 8.0% profit margin. It has a net debt-to-EBITDA ratio of 
1.5x.  
 The Coca-Cola Company 
Coca-Cola, founded in 1892, is a global beverages company. The company 
markets its brands in over 200 countries across all continents. Its portfolio of 
~200 brands includes flagship brands such as Coca-Cola, Sprite, Fanta and 
Minute Maid. Coca-Cola is headquartered in the US and employs ~62 thousand 
FTEs.  
Coca-Cola realised $ 35.4 billion of 2017A revenue on which it realised a 30.7% 













PepsiCo, formed in 1965 through the merger of the Pepsi-Cola Company and 
Frito-Lay, is the second largest food and beverages company in the world in 
terms of revenue. The company markets its brands in over 200 countries across 
all continents. Its portfolio includes flagship brands such as Pepsi, Mountain Dew, 
Lay’s, Gatorade, Tropicana, Doritos and Cheetos. PepsiCo is headquartered in 
the US and employs ~264 thousand FTEs.  
PepsiCo realised $ 63.5 billion of 2017A revenue on which it realised a 20.0% 
EBITDA margin and an 7.6% profit margin. It has a net debt-to-EBITDA ratio of 
3.0x.  
 Dr Pepper Snapple Group 
Dr Pepper Snapple, formed in 2008 as a Cadbury Schweppes spin-off, is a 
multinational beverages company. The company produces its brands across 22 
production facilities and markets its brands in across North and Latin America. Its 
portfolio of ~50 brands includes flagship brands such as A&W Root Beer, Crush, 
Canada Dry and Orangina. Dr Pepper Snapple is headquartered in the US and 
employs ~21 thousand FTEs.  
Dr Pepper Snapple realised $ 6.7 billion of 2017A revenue on which it realised a 
23.6% EBITDA margin and an 16.1% profit margin. It has a net debt-to-EBITDA 
ratio of 2.8x.  
  Spirits 
 Diageo 
Diageo, formed in 1997 through the merger of Guinness and Grand Metropolitan, 
is a global distiller with significant beer assets. The company operates across 
~80 offices and markets its brands in over 180 countries across all continents. Its 
portfolio of ~200 brands includes flagship brands such as Johnnie Walker, 
Smirnoff, Captain Morgan, Baileys and Guinness. Diageo is headquartered in the 
UK and employs ~30 thousand FTEs.  
Diageo realised £ 18.1 billion of 2017A revenue on which it realised a 32.2% 
EBITDA margin and an 26.6% profit margin. It has a net debt-to-EBITDA ratio of 
2.7x. 
 Pernod Ricard 
Pernod Ricard, founded in 1975, is a global distiller. The company produces its 
brands across ~100 production facilities and markets its brands in over 80 
countries across all continents. Its portfolio includes flagship brands such as 
 
 








Absolut, Havana Club, Ricard and Royal. Pernod Ricard is headquartered in 
France and employs ~20 thousand FTEs.  
Pernod Ricard realised € 9.0 billion of 2016-2017A revenue on which it realised a 
29.0% EBITDA margin and an 18.0% profit margin. It has a net debt-to-EBITDA 
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